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1: Introduction 
 
The debate on novel confirmation addresses one of the classical questions in 
philosophy of science. Does confirmation by novel empirical data (novel confirmation) 
provide stronger confirmation of a theory than the consistency of a theory with empirical 
data that had entered its construction process (accommodation)? The predictivist position 
holds that it does, which seems to agree with what a majority of scientists takes to be the 
intuitive understanding of scientific reasoning. Many philosophers of science throughout the 
centuries have rejected predictivism, however. In the 19th century, Whewell endorsed 
predictivism while Mill rejected it. In the mid 20th century, Popper and Lakatos supported 
the significance of novel prediction in their own ways. Since the 1990s, the debate has 
gained new impetus within a Bayesian framework. While Bayesianism was initially held by 
many to be incompatible with predictivism, it was soon understood that a sufficiently 
general Bayesian reconstruction can account for a confirmation extra value of novel 
confirmation (Maher 1988, Kahn et al. 1994, Barnes 2008). Still, a number of influential 
philosophers (see e.g. Worrall 2002, Mayo 1996) have argued in recent years that an 
emphasis on novel confirmation fails to grasp the core mechanisms of confirmation.  
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In this paper, I present a new argument for predictivism. This argument is based on 
the concept of ‘limitations to scientific underdetermination’ that has been discussed in a 
number of recent works (Dawid 2006, Dawid 2010, Dawid 2013, Dawid, Hartmann and 
Sprenger forthcoming,) in the context of empirically unconfirmed theories. According to 
those works, the assessment of the number of possible alternatives to the theory scientists 
have actually developed can shed light on that theory’s success chances even before the 
theory has found empirical confirmation. Therefore, it is argued, such ‘assessments of 
scientific underdetermination’ can themselves constitute theory confirmation under certain 
conditions. In the following, this approach shall be applied to the question of novel 
confirmation. It shall be argued that novel confirmation, unlike accommodation, tells 
something about the number of possible alternative scientific theories and thereby has 
confirmation extra value over accommodation.  
The presented approach shares some general characteristics with other suggestions 
that have been put forward for explaining novel confirmation in recent decades (Maher 
1988, Kahn et al. 1994, Hitchcock and Sober 2004, Barnes 2008). It does not aim at fully 
replacing those earlier suggestions. Various individual reasons for an extra-value of novel 
confirmation can apply in science, and each of them may be of particular significance in 
certain scientific contexts. The presented approach adds to that list of reasons and, as will 
turn out, is of particular relevance in fundamental physics. I will argue, however, that the 
significance of the presented approach goes beyond merely providing an additional aspect of 
novel confirmation. As I hope to demonstrate, the significance of assessments of scientific 
underdetermination for the question of novel confirmation integrates the latter into a 
broader understanding of the mechanism of theory confirmation in science. It establishes 
that the extra value of novel confirmation is by no means tangential to the core mechanisms 
of scientific reasoning but exemplifies a crucial element of the way scientists determine and 
understand the status of their theories. After a brief introduction to the novel confirmation 
debate in Section 2, the core argument is presented in Sections 3 and 4. Section 5 compares 
the presented approach to other suggestions in the literature. Section 6 then looks 
specifically at the case of fundamental physics. Some conclusions are presented in Section 7. 
 
 
2: The Problem of Novel Confirmation  
 
Following Zahar (1973) and Worrall (1978), I take novel confirmation to be 
confirmation of a theory H by data that did not play a heuristic role in the development of 
the theory. I further require that novel confirmation is constituted by data that is not just 
‘more of the same’ but amounts to a new phenomenon set apart from what has been 
observed before. The question now is whether or not novel confirmation in the given sense 
has higher confirmation value than accommodation, i. e. a theory’s agreement with 
empirical data that did play a heuristic role in its development.  
The problem of novel confirmation can be formulated in a transparent way within a 
Bayesian framework. In order to see the problem in this context, let us first confine the 
discussion to empirical data within the intended domain of the scientific theory to be 
analysed. That is, we only consider data of the kind that might in principle be predicted by 
the scientific theory H. Let us assume that some data E is collected in an experiment. The 
Bayesian formalization then simply expresses the relation between the probability that a 
theory H is true if evidence E were the case and the probability of the truth of H when E is 
not taken into account. If the data E is predicted by theory H, the truth of E raises the 
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probability of the truth of H. E therefore confirms H. Contingent historical facts regarding the 
influence data E had on the construction process of H are not expressible in terms of data 
that is predicted by H. Therefore, such facts do not enter the analysis. Novel confirmation on 
that basis cannot be awarded higher significance than accommodation.   
It is generally acknowledged today that the above analysis on its own does not refute 
predictivism. The Bayesian approach can be extended to include empirical data that is not 
predictable by the theory under investigation. In particular, one can take into account the 
observation that some empirical data E has not entered the construction process of theory 
H. While this observation is of an empirical nature, theory H does not predict whether or not 
it occurs. Once one includes data of the described kind into a Bayesian analysis, novel 
confirmation can get additional confirmation value compared to accommodation. Let OH(E) 
be the observation that E has not entered the construction of H and OH(E) the observation 
that E has entered the construction of H. It may then be the case that 
 
                                        ( |       )   ( |       )   (1) 
 
where T is the statement that theory H is true. Justifying statement (1) requires additional 
conceptual input, however. Since neither OH(E) nor OH(E) constitute evidence of a kind 
predictable by theory H, it is not immediately clear on what grounds that kind of evidence 
can change the probability of the truth of theory H. The most straightforward way to 
establish that it does is to find a new class of statements Y that can predict occurrences of 
the kind (E Λ OH(E)). Therefore, (E Λ OH(E)) will under normal circumstances confirm Y.  If the 
truth of Y, in turn, raises the probability of the truth of H, the extra-value of novel 
confirmation is established.  
The described line of reasoning was followed first in Maher (1988) and later by a 
number of other authors. These authors make various suggestions regarding the nature of 
the claim that is directly supported by (E Λ OH(E)). Maher proposes that novel confirmation 
tells something about the quality of the method of scientific theory construction. As Maher 
argues, we may expect that a good method of theory construction produces theories which 
are predictively successful with a higher probability than theories produced by a bad 
method. The hypothesis YM that the method M that has been deployed in the construction 
of a theory H was good thus predicts that the rate of novel predictive success of theories 
produced by M will be above average. In other words, it predicts that among the novel 
predictions of theory H, that is among those predictions of data E by theory H for which 
OH(E) is true, there will be a particularly high ratio of instances where (E Λ OH(E)) is true. Any 
instance of (E Λ OH(E) then will in turn increase the probability for YM being true.  This in turn 
implies that instances of novel confirmation of theory H increase the probability of the truth 
of so far untested predictions of theory H, which increases the probability of the truth of H.  
Therefore, OH(E) contributes to the confirmation of H. 
Let us now look at the case of accommodation, where OH(E) is true. No scientifically 
coherent method, be it good or bad, can generate a theory based on data E that contradicts 
E. Maher does not address the question as to whether the observation that a theory was 
generated at all tells something about the quality of the method applied (One might imagine 
that bad methods fail more often to generate any theory that agrees with the data than 
good methods). Instead, he focuses on the point that instances of accommodation to data E 
do not constitute examples of method M generating successful predictions. Therefore, he 
argues, instances of accommodation do not increase the probability of the truth of YM and 
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no higher truth probability for H can be inferred. Maher’s argument therefore demonstrates 
a confirmation extra value of novel confirmation over accommodation. 
Other authors make alternative suggestions regarding the nature of the statement Y 
that predicts novel confirmation. Kahn et al. (1992) propose that the occurrence of novel 
confirmation is taken by the scientific community as an indication of the high quality of 
those scientists who developed the corresponding theory. Scientists of high quality are taken 
to have a tendency of developing predictively successful theories. Each instance of novel 
predictive success thus raises the trust in the capabilities of the scientists who developed the 
corresponding theory. A high quality of the involved scientists then in a second step is linked 
to a higher probability of the truth of theories they construct. This finally raises the trust in 
the truth of a predictively successful theory beyond the level that had been achieved based 
on the theory’s agreement with the empirical data.  
Barnes (2008) agrees with Kahn et al. on the point that novel confirmation is relevant 
primarily for assessing the quality of involved scientists.  He differs from their account in two 
important ways, however. First, he argues that the crucial criterion for novel confirmation 
must be theory endorsement rather than theory building. Scientists may come up with a 
theory without actually believing it. Barnes argues that it would be implausible to relate 
these scientists’ qualities to the appraisal of the theory they developed but misjudged. 
According to Barnes, novel confirmation thus should be taken to apply if a theory has been 
endorsed by a scientist without relying on the confirming data. Second, Barnes emphasizes 
that a scientist’s endorsement of theories which then turn out to be empirically successful 
should be understood to be based on her true background beliefs: scientists endorse a 
theory based on their background beliefs. If those beliefs are largely true, they will tend to 
endorse theories which later turn out empirically successful. Novel confirmation thus is an 
indicator of true background beliefs of those scientists which endorsed the theory. The 
scientists’ abilities are thereby connected back to objective facts about the world.  
A quite different perspective on novel confirmation is developed by Hitchcock and 
Sober (2004).  They argue that some, if only limited, advantage of novel confirmation over 
accommodation can be extracted from an analysis of curve fitting. If one tries to fit given 
data-points by a freely chosen function, there is a risk of mistaking purely statistical aspects 
of the distribution of data points for structural characteristics of the true generating function 
of those data points. This can lead to a sub-optimal selection of fit-functions if one does not 
account for that danger by adequate penalty terms for complexity (Forster and Sober 1994). 
It can be shown that a function that avoids overfitting provides more accurate predictions of 
future data points than a function that involves overfitting. On that basis, novel confirmation 
can be used as an indicator that the chosen function actually reproduces structural 
characteristics of the true generating function and over-fitting has been avoided. Novel 
confirmation thus gives extra information about the quality of a fit function that goes 
beyond what can be provided by accommodation.  
 Though Hitchcock and Sober differ significantly from the approaches presented 
before, their rationale adheres to the same general scheme of reasoning. In their case, the 
meta-statement YHS is the claim that over-fitting has been avoided when constructing H. YHS 
predicts that higher predictive success rates will be achieved. Any instance of predictive 
success confirms YHS and thus also raises the probability of future predictive success of 
theory H. 
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3: Limitations to Scientific Underdetermination and Novel 
Confirmation 
 
Let us once more repeat the general structure of the novel confirmation arguments 
reconstructed in Section 2. We select a theory H and a hypothesis Y about theory H so that 
the following conditions hold:  
1) The truth (or empirical viability within a certain regime) of H cannot be 
univocally determined based on the available data. 
2) The truth of Y cannot be univocally determined based on the available data. 
3) If Y is true, H has a higher probability of being true (or empirically viable 
within a certain regime) than if Y is false.  
4) The observation OH(E)  that novel confirmation of H by empirical data E has 
occurred raises the probability that Y is true. 
5) The observation OH(E) that accommodation of empirical data E to H has 
occurred does not raise the probability that Y is true (or raises it to a lesser 
degree than OH(E)).  
From 1),..,5) it follows that novel confirmation raises the probability of H being true 
to a higher degree than accommodation. We thus have a confirmation extra value of 
novel confirmation over accommodation. 
 
I now propose the following new candidate for statement Y:  
 
Y=Ln(E0,S1): There are no more than n different possible scientific theories which are 
in agreement with the available data E0 and can be distinguished by some not yet 
realized set of experiments S1. 
 
To make this statement meaningful, two kinds of clarification are necessary. We must define 
what counts as a possible scientific theory and we must introduce rules for the individuation 
of theories within that framework. I will postpone those clarifications to the next section, 
however, and first present the basic structure of the argument. To that end, I will first 
motivate the proposed choice of hypothesis Y and then show that, provided that it can be 
turned into a meaningful statement, it satisfies conditions 2) to 5) for theories H that satisfy 
condition 1).   
 Let us begin with some general thoughts about the role of alternative scientific 
theories in the scientific process. Usually, we take scientific theory building to be 
underdetermined by the available empirical data: we tend to think that we could, in 
principle, construct a number of scientific theories which are compatible with the available 
data. We may have found some of those theories, or maybe just one of them, but we 
assume that as yet ‘unconceived alternatives’ (Sklar 1980, Stanford 2006) exist as well. If we 
assumed that the underdetermination of scientific theory building were entirely unlimited, 
however, we could not explain why novel predictive success arises in science at all. To 
understand this important point, let us imagine the following scenario: we have collected 
empirical data E0 in a set of experiments S0 and have developed a theory H that can account 
for that data. Theory H makes further predictions which we intend to test in a new set of 
experiments S1.  Now let us assume that theory building is entirely unlimited, that is, any 
imaginable outcome of the upcoming experiments S1 can be accounted for by a satisfactory 
scientific theory. If that were the case, why should we believe that the predictions with 
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respect to the outcomes of S1 provided by the theory H we have actually developed will turn 
out true? Given that we have developed theory H just on the basis of data E0 and do not 
have a truth detector that guides us towards the true theory, what reasons do we have for 
believing that ours rather than one of the uncounted empirically different alternative 
scientific theories makes the correct predictions?  
Actually, scientists often do find themselves in that kind of situation and indeed see 
no reason for trusting their theory. (In particular they may have developed many theories 
already and have no reason for trusting one rather than the other.) There are other contexts, 
however, where scientists do trust the predictions of their theories. In order to trust those 
predictions, scientists must believe that the number of possible alternative theories is, in 
some sense, significantly limited. If there are only few scientific theories which can account 
for data E0, then chances are that the one scientists have developed will turn out to be true, 
or at any rate empirically successful at the next stage of experimental testing. If scientists 
can infer limitations to scientific underdetermination from predictive success, however, this 
means that a hypothesis on limitations of scientific underdetermination in the given context 
satisfies condition 3) of the five conditions stated above. Such a hypothesis therefore looks 
like a natural candidate for Y. Ln(E0,S1) constitutes a straightforward form of a claim of 
limitations to scientific underdetermination.  So let us try to develop a specific model on its 
basis.  
Before entering the details of the analysis, it is important to make one remark on the 
definition of confirmation in our context. In Bayesian terms, confirmation of theory H is 
usually taken to correspond to a rise in the probability of the truth of H. Since the absolute 
truth of theories raises problems in the context of physics – for example, physicists often 
confirm theories which are known to be strictly speaking false since they are inconsistent 
beyond a given regime – it seems advisable to relate confirmation to a more modest concept 
than truth, that is to empirical viability within a given regime. I call a theory empirically 
viable within a given regime if it can reproduce all empirical data within an intended regime 
of empirical testing. Non-relativistic quantum mechanics is empirically viable in this sense if 
it can reproduce all empirical data in microphysics in the regime where relativistic effects 
can be neglected.  
We want to consider a series of generations of experimental testing Si , i=0,1,2.., 
where each new generation of experimental testing Si+1 includes the earlier generation of 
experiments Si. The observation that Ei has not entered the construction process of H is 
called OH(Ei). n(Ei,Sj) denotes the number of possible alternative theories which are 
consistent with empirical data Ei and can be distinguished by experiments Sj, where i<j. 
We now introduce a theory H that has been developed based on empirical evidence 
E0 that was collected in a set of experiments S0. Theory H accounts for E0 and makes non-
trivial predictions regarding the outcome of a future set of experiments S1. Scientists then 
carry out experiments S1 and find that the collected evidence E1 is consistent with the 
predictions of H.  
In order to discuss this process, we want to assume the following model. There are a 
finite number n(E0,S1) of possible theories which can be constructed in agreement with E0 
and can be empirically distinguished by experiments S1. Each theory that is compatible with 
E0 has the same subjective probability
1 of being viable, irrespectively of the question 
whether or not it has actually been developed by scientists. In other words, scientists have 
                                                          
1
 Subjective probabilities denote the probabilities we attribute to the theories based on our understanding of the 
overall situation. 
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no other way than agreement with empirical data to assess the quality of a theory. Inversely, 
we can then conclude that, if n possible theories exist and scientists find one theory H that 
accounts for the available data E0, the chances of that theory being viable with regards to a 
set of characteristic experiments S1 is  
 
                               (  
 |  (  )   
     )                                                   (2) 
 
 
where   
  denotes the claim the theory H is empirically viable with regards to its 
characteristic experiments S1.  
We thus have established a significant connection between the number of possible 
alternative theories n and the probability of novel predictive success of a given theory. We 
can then make the following statement: Ln(E0,S1) with a low number n can explain the novel 
predictive success of theory H since, under the condition that Ln(E0,S1) is true, there is a 
significant probability that theory H is empirically successful. As long as no other equally 
satisfactory types of explanation of the novel predictive success of H are available (that is, no 
explanations which do not rely on limitations to scientific underdetermination), inference to 
the best explanation can lead to the conclusion that some Ln(E0,S1) with low n is probably 
true. In other words, we can infer from novel predictive success of theory H that 
underdetermination is limited. Novel confirmation with respect to data E1 raises the 
probabilities of the truth of statements Ln(E0,S1) with low n.  
Now let us consider another set of characteristic novel predictions of theory H that 
can be tested by a new set of experiments S2. Just like the predictions with respect to S1, 
these predictions are provided by theory H which resulted from the scientist’s search for a 
coherent theory that could account for data E0. Given that we deal with core implications of 
the same theory and remain within the same research context, we have no reasons to 
assume (in the absence of additional information) that the spectrum of possible alternative 
theories to H which give different empirical predictions with respect to S2 will be radically 
wider than the spectrum of alternative theories that give different predictions with respect 
to S1. The limitations to scientific underdetermination established with respect to theory 
individuation based on S1 therefore should be roughly applicable with respect to E2. We are 
led to assume that high probabilities for statements Ln(E0,S1) with low n imply similarly high 
probabilities for the corresponding low n statements Ln(E0,S2) and therefore also high 
probabilities for low n statements Ln(E1,S2).
2 A theory that has provided successful 
predictions with respect to data E1 thus is more likely to provide successful predictions with 
respect to empirical data E2 in the future than a theory that has not provided successful 
predictions and therefore provides no basis for believing in Ln(E1,S2) with low n. Since 
empirical data that is predicted by theory H confirms H, this means that novel confirmation 
raises the probability that theory H will be empirically confirmed in experiments S2. Thereby, 
it raises the probability that H is true or empirically viable within an intended regime. 
Now let us compare this situation with the case of accommodation of data E1, 
expressed by OH(E1). O
H(E1) implies that H agrees with data E1. We thus have: 
 
                                                             (  
 |      )                          
 
                                                          
2
 Obviously, we have n(E0,S2) > n(E0,S1) since S2 includes S1; and n(E0,S2) > n(E1,S2) since E1 includes E0. 
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The fact that H is in agreement with data E1 thus is fully explained by O
H(E1). 
Statements of the kind Ln(E0,S1) thus cannot contribute to the explanation of O
H(E1). Thus, 
there is no basis to infer a small number of possible theories Ln(E0,S1)  from the fact that H 
agrees with E1. This implies that there is no basis either to draw any conclusions with regard 
to Ln(E1,S2). Accommodation does not provide any confirmation extra value via the 
assessment of the number of possible scientific theories. It follows that novel confirmation 
by data E1 provides stronger confirmation of theory H than accommodation to data E1. 
 
 
4: Specifying the Number of Alternative Theories 
 
So far, we have used the statement Ln(E,S) without offering a solid basis for its meaning. It is 
clear that, without a rigid framework that determines what counts as a scientific theory in a 
given context, a statement on the number of possible scientific theories must remain 
meaningless. The required framework can be established by defining constraints C that have 
to be satisfied by scientific theories. In order to be effective, the constraints C must allow 
scientists to be very confident that there is a scientifically viable solution to the problem 
they are working on that satisfies C. If one could not be very confident that some theory that 
satisfies C is scientifically viable in the intended regime, the number of theories which do 
satisfy C could not tell much about the empirical viability of an individual theory H from this 
group. Thus, the question arises: what kind of condition justifies such confidence?  
Conditions which are related to a specific scientific strategy or to specific conceptual 
presumptions always run the risk of being toppled at the next step of scientific progress and 
therefore don’t seem advisable. Rather, C should be constituted by very basic ‘scientificality’ 
conditions. There should be a scientific consensus in the field that a theory that violates any 
of the conditions C would not be accepted as a scientific theory. The set of scientificality 
conditions may be expected to include requirements of consistency, the absence of ad-hoc 
assumptions to explain individual events out of a large ensemble, and a certain degree of 
universality. In contemporary fundamental physics, these three conditions arguably provide 
a workable framework for theory development. It seems fair to say that any formal solution 
to a problem that fulfils the three conditions (or just gives reasons to believe that it can fulfil 
them) counts as a serious scientific contender. In less formal fields where the concept of 
consistency (sometimes even the notion of consistency with the data) is more difficult to 
define, other field-specific conditions have to be added.  
It is important to note that, even though a specific number n only makes sense with 
respect to specific conditions C, a precise specification of the scientificality conditions is not 
necessary for giving explanatory extra value to novel confirmation based on our argument. 
All that is necessary is to be very confident that the true theory fulfils some well-defined set 
of conditions C which are also adhered to by the scientists who develop theories in the field. 
Estimating the number of possible alternatives then means estimating the number of all 
alternative theories which satisfy these conditions C. Since our estimate of that number 
relies entirely on the observation of novel confirmation rather than on an analysis of the 
constraints C themselves, a fuzzy understanding of C does not impede the analysis. 
It remains to be clarified how to individuate theories with the framework of 
scientificality conditions C. Before entering the details of this discussion, one important point 
should be emphasised. It is the goal of this analysis to determine the kind of information 
which can be extracted specifically from novel confirmation and which can eventually be 
used for raising the probability of the empirical viability of the given theory. We aim at 
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supporting the following claim: given the chosen principles of theory individuation, novel 
confirmation can provide information about the number of possible theories. A claim of this 
kind will always be embedded within a specific scientific context. We do not need to look for 
a principle of theory individuation that is universally adhered to in science. Since intuitions 
on what counts as an individual theory vary considerably in science, such a universally valid 
principle would be impossible to find. It is important, however, that the presented principles 
of theory individuation are not alien to science and are applied in relevant scientific 
contexts. Examples of specific scientific contexts will be given along the way in order to 
demonstrate that this condition is satisfied. 
So what can we say about the specifics of theory individuation? Since we are 
interested in predictive success, we want to distinguish theories by their empirical 
implications. Therefore, we count theories separately only if they give different empirical 
predictions.3 Not every theory that is in principle empirically distinguishable from H is of 
relevance for understanding an individual instance of novel confirmation, however. In 
Section 3, we have discussed novel confirmation within the context of solving a specific set 
of problems related to the task of fitting some empirical data E0.  Once scientists have found 
one solution H to that set of problems, the prospects of the empirical success of theory H 
with respect to its core predictions E1 depended on the number of alternative solutions to 
the specific set of problems related to fitting data E0. Conceptual alternatives which were 
based on the same solution to these problems and could only become empirically 
distinguishable beyond the range of its characteristic predictions E1 did not affect the 
chances of predictive success within that context.4 Therefore, we only counted theories as 
alternatives which constituted autonomous solutions to the set of scientific problems that 
were to be solved in the given context. Theories which could differ only with respect to their 
more far-reaching implications but shared the same effective theory that could already be 
understood as a solution to the given set of problems did not count as different theories. 
Having thus provided the basis for distinguishing empirically distinct theories from 
theories which are empirically undistinguishable within the given empirical regime, we still 
have to draw the distinction between empirically distinguishable theories and empirically 
distinguishable specifications of one theory. The adequate way of drawing that distinction 
depends on the level on which the phenomenon of novel prediction occurs in a given 
context. Let us illustrate this by looking at the example of the prediction of the Higgs particle 
by the standard model of particle physics before the discovery of the Higgs particle in 
summer 2012. The standard model at the time predicted the existence of a Higgs particle 
with a mass within a specific range of values. This was the level at which the standard model 
prediction was taken seriously. Therefore, it makes much sense to count as one theory the 
general scheme of the standard model that provided the described prediction. Let us 
compare this choice of theory individuation with a different one where we would insert 
precise values for the Higgs mass and count each realization of the standard model with a 
specific value of the Higgs mass as an individual ‘theory’. This strategy is inadequate because 
no physicist would have taken the specific predictions of these individual ‘theories’ seriously. 
                                                          
3
 While some philosophers and participants to the foundational debate of quantum mechanics don’t adhere to this 
principle of theory individuation, it seems fair to say that it is endorsed in most parts of empirical science: 
theories are taken to be genuinely distinct only if they can be distinguished by empirical means. 
4
 To give an example from actual science, the chances of success for the predictions of the standard model of 
particle physics, which aims at describing nuclear interactions, are not affected by the range of possible solutions 
to the problem of the unification of nuclear interactions and gravity. Theories concerned with the latter problem 
have their characteristic predictions at a much higher energy scale and therefore remain irrelevant for the 
phenomenology predicted by the standard model. 
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Before the Higgs mass was measured experimentally, there was no reason to believe in one 
of those ‘theories’ rather than another. Therefore, the experimental measurement of a Higgs 
mass of 125 GeV was not understood in terms of a successful novel prediction of the 
corresponding ‘theory’ that ‘predicted’ that mass value. Rather, it was understood as an 
empirical specification of a parameter value that had not been predicted by the theory itself.  
Counting each value for the Higgs mass as an individual theory thus makes no sense because 
it does not reflect the actual character of the scientific prediction in the given case.  
Based on the presented principles of theory individuation, we can now understand 
Ln(E0,S1) as the statement  that there are no more than n theories which satisfy scientificality 
conditions C, can account for data E0 and can be empirically distinguished based on 
experiments S1. 
The question remains as to whether the model presented in Section 3 is sufficiently 
realistic as a model of scientific praxis. One may object to this model by arguing that actual 
scientific reasoning can be influenced by additional principles and therefore does not accord 
with the assumption that scientists can infer a theory’s quality only from the theory’s 
agreement with empirical data. In this vein, it has been suggested (see e.g. Boyd 1990) that, 
among a number of consistent scientific solutions, the simpler or more beautiful solutions 
have significantly higher probabilities of being true or viable.5 In its general form, this 
objection does not threaten our approach, however. If we assume that scientists are guided 
by principles of simplicity and beauty, it may be expected that the relevance of those 
principles increases the probability that scientists find viable theories. As long as the effect is 
not too strong, it suffices from our perspective to state that P(T1|OH(E)) > 1/n rather than 
P(T1|OH(E)) = 1/n must hold under the given circumstances and the claim on limitations to 
scientific underdetermination remains intact. If one is very convinced that a certain level of 
simplicity or beauty must be met by the empirically viable theory, the corresponding 
conditions can be included in the conditions C and the entire analysis can be carried out on 
that basis. In that case, criteria of simplicity or beauty do not replace the assessment of 
limitations to scientific underdetermination but merely modify the framework of that 
assessment. 
The only way to deny the relevance of assessments of limitations to scientific 
underdetermination in the given context would be to claim that scientists can be sure always 
to find the simplest and most beautiful theory first and that the simplest and most beautiful 
theory is always true. This, however, seems clearly contradicted by the historical record in 
science. A low number of alternative theories therefore can provide a fairly satisfactory 
explanation of novel predictive success of a corresponding theory H under very plausible 
assumptions even if elegance or simplicity do increase a theory’s probability of being true. 
 
 
5: Comparison with Other Approaches 
 
One crucial point distinguishes the approach of limitations to underdetermination from the 
conceptions of Maher, Kahn et al. and Barnes. The latter assume that novel confirmation 
tells us something about the quality of the contingent processes of theory generation or 
theory endorsement. According to them, we can learn from novel confirmation about the 
                                                          
5
 I have serious doubts about the deployment of principles of simplicity and beauty in the given context and do 
not endorse that approach myself. The paragraph just aims at demonstrating that, if the approach makes sense, it 
is compatible with the approach of limitations to underdetermination.  
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quality of the scientists who happened to be concerned with the theory or about the quality 
of the method that happened to be followed when the theory was created. The approach of 
limitations to underdetermination, to the contrary, is based on the idea that novel 
confirmation tells us something about the space of possible alternative theories. Novel 
confirmation thus is taken to clarify the ‘objective’ scientific framework within which the 
theory is developed.  
 Despite that substantial difference, the approach we propose is conceptually related 
to Maher’s. We want to clarify this relation by modifying Maher’s approach in a way that 
leads towards the question of limitations to underdetermination. Two steps of modification 
are necessary to that end. First, we have to place Maher’s method M at a more fundamental 
level than intended by him and take it to be the scientific method itself. On that basis, of 
course, Maher’s idea to distinguish individual instances of theory generation based on the 
specific methods that were applied does not work anymore. After all, any serious scientist 
uses the ‘scientific method’. In order to make use of Maher’s approach nevertheless, we 
therefore have to compare scientific problems rather than theories which aim at solving the 
same problem. We then assume that the scientific method is more likely to lead to true (or 
empirically viable) theories in some contexts than in others. According to our modified 
Maher-approach, novel confirmation tells us that we are facing a scientific context where 
the scientific method works well in the stated sense. But why is it that the scientific method 
is more likely to provide true or viable results in some specific contexts than in others? In 
order to answer this question, we introduce our concept of limitations to scientific 
underdetermination: in some contexts, the scientific method provides a framework where 
only few theoretical solutions are possible, which implies that the solution the scientists 
come up with has decent chances of being viable.  
 Method thus plays an important role in Maher’s approach as well as in the approach 
of limitations to underdetermination. In the latter, however, it merely provides a framework 
of reasoning and does not do the work of distinguishing between different theories. This 
reduced role of method in the approach of limitations to underdetermination avoids 
criticism that has been levied by several authors against Maher’s deployment of method. 
These lines of criticism (see e.g. Howson & Franklin 1991 and Lange 2001) have emphasised 
the ambivalence of the concept of method deployed by Maher: it seems unclear whether it 
is possible to identify methods within the scientific process which show the formal 
characteristics attributed to method in Maher’s model; and it seems difficult to formulate a 
plausible and generally applicable conceptual distinction between method and theory in 
scientific contexts.  
Marc Lange argues that the apparent intuitive strength of Maher’s presentation of 
the method concept is due to his choice of a specific example that does not represent a 
genuinely scientific scenario at all. Maher presents as his core example a scenario where two 
‘scientists’ are asked to write down the results (heads or tails) of a series of 100 coin tosses 
which are to be carried out in an experiment. The first ‘scientist’ S1 sees 99 tosses and writes 
down the entire series afterwards. The second ‘scientist’ S2 sees only 50 tosses and then 
writes down the entire series. Maher considers the case where S2 gets her predictions of 
tosses 51-99 exactly right. He plausibly argues that, after having seen 99 tosses and the 
statements of S1 and S2, we would give the prediction of S1 regarding toss number 100 just 
a probability of 50% while we would give the prediction of S2 a probability that is much 
higher. The reason for that, Maher claims, is that we infer from the novel confirmations in 
the case of S2 that S2 has a good method of generating her predictions. In the case of S1 
who just accommodated data known to her, we have no reason for making that inference. 
12 
 
Novel confirmation thus may be understood to confirm a theory (in the given case S2’s 
statement of the full sequence) based on an inference to the quality of the method that 
generated the theory.  
 Lange criticises that this scenario does not exemplify a comparison between two 
alternative methods of generating a scientific theory. Rather, novel confirmation is required 
in this scenario for establishing that the ‘scientist’ has a reasonable method at all and is not 
just guessing. In the absence of novel confirmation, one would assume that the coin tossing 
is a random process and no viable theory exists that predicts its outcome. We would thus 
assume that any prediction amounts to mere guesswork. Only strong examples of novel 
confirmation can alter our position in specific cases. To the contrary, actual scientific 
reasoning can be expected to aim seriously at understanding the law-guidedness of the 
process under investigation. The question as to whether or not we should attribute a serious 
scientific method to the scientist who develops a certain theory thus does not arise. Maher’s 
account fails on a general basis, according to Lange, because the distinction between 
method and theory is only clear as long as ‘theory’ is understood in the simplistic way 
exemplified in the coin toss example. There, the theory is a simple data model and all that is 
conceptual is attributed to the method. We can only see the data model and the conceptual 
basis (the method) remains entirely hidden to us. In genuine examples of scientific 
reasoning, however, theories are highly complex and multi-layered concepts themselves. 
Moreover, the conceptual basis is openly explained to the scientific community, which can 
judge the quality of both theory and method based on that information. It thus seems far 
less obvious whether and how theories can be clearly distinguished from methods and 
whether much can be gained from the distinction between method and theory with respect 
to understanding the role of novel confirmation.   
 The approach presented in this paper can be understood as a way of avoiding the 
described problem. The method of theory building is identified with the scientific method 
itself. The scientificality conditions that define the scientific method are so general that they 
can be clearly distinguished from the principles which define a specific theory within its 
framework. Moreover, the ‘scientific method’ is shared by all scientists in the field and thus 
does not bear the responsibility of distinguishing between more and less promising theories. 
That work is done by the limitations to scientific underdetermination, which, as I hope to 
have demonstrated in the previous section, can be defined with more clarity than the quality 
of a method.  
 Greater conceptual clarity may be seen as a general advantage of the approach of 
limitations to scientific underdetermination over those of Kahn et al. and Barnes as well. The 
scientist’s capability as used in Kahn et al. is a rather general and vague concept whose 
explanatory power may be taken to suffer from that vagueness. Barnes tries to fill that 
concept with meaning by relating it to correct background assumptions, which, however, 
remain a fairly vague concept themselves. The notion of possible alternative scientific 
theories arguably constitutes a more specific and therefore more powerful explanatory tool. 
 
 
6: The Case of Fundamental Physics 
 
 For a number of reasons, the approach of limitations to underdetermination appears 
more convincing than the approaches of Kahn et al., Barnes and Hitchcock and Sober in the 
context of fundamental physics and comparable disciplines. In order to demonstrate this, we 
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first have to analyse the wide range of problems faced by the cited approaches in the 
specific context of fundamental physics. 
  Let us start with another look at Hitchcock and Sober’s idea to reduce the significance 
of novel confirmation to testing the degree of over-fitting. Hitchcock and Sober concede in 
their paper that their analysis does not necessarily allow for a straightforward extrapolation 
towards more complex scientific theory building. In the context of fundamental physics, 
Hitchcock and Sober’s approach indeed seems largely inadequate. While scientific analysis 
based on curve-fitting does occur in some contexts – good examples are attempts to find 
long term regularities of sun-spot activity or large scale structures of the universe – much of 
fundamental physics happens at the other end of the spectrum: fundamental physical 
theories tend to be developed within complex mathematical frameworks where consistency 
requirements strongly constrain the options of coherent theory building. The most 
impressive examples of predictive success in fundamental physics occur in highly constrained 
regimes where the significance of novel confirmation cannot be related to the question of 
over-fitting at all.  
This can be shown with particular clarity in the case of the successful prediction of 
light bending by Einstein’s theory of general relativity, which arguably constitutes one of the 
most famous examples of novel confirmation in science. General relativity was developed in 
order to reconcile the principles of special relativity with gravitation. During the ten years 
Einstein worked on solving the conceptual problems which arose on the way towards 
reaching his theoretical goal, no specific empirical data entered the process of theory 
development. Thus no-one could reasonably doubt the viability of general relativity based on 
the claim that it was over-fitting empirical data. The situation in quantum mechanics or 
gauge field theory is quite similar. Successful novel predictions are largely based on the 
deployment of general physical principles which offer solutions to consistency problems that 
have arisen at a different level of analysis than data fitting. Over-fitting of data does not 
constitute a relevant question in those contexts. It seems fair to say that Hitchcock and 
Sober do not address those aspects of novel confirmation which are most crucial in 
fundamental physics. 
 A similar verdict seems justified with respect to Kahn et al. (1992). The conception of 
individual scientists who offer their own theories on a subject and have to be evaluated in 
order to determine their theories’ prospects may be applicable in some cases but seems far-
fetched as a general characterization of the field.  The most influential physical theories like 
quantum mechanics or the standard model of particle physics – though first suggested in 
their basic outlines by individual scientists or small research groups – later turned into multi-
faceted joint enterprises of concern to the entire research field. Novel confirmation of those 
theories often happened after that theory had become the dominant scientific research 
program in the field worked on by large numbers of scientists and research groups of various 
qualities. More often than not, no alternative theory capable of solving the same theoretical 
problems was known at the time. In this vein, it does not make much sense to understand 
the significance of novel confirmation in terms of its role as a means of assessing the quality 
of individual scientists or research groups.  If at all, one would have to understand the 
assessment as referring to the scientific abilities of the physics community as a whole. It is 
quite difficult to understand, however, what could be meant by that. 
 Barnes’ approach seems better equipped to deal with that specific criticism. In his 
understanding, novel confirmation does not determine individual capacities of physicists. It 
rather determines the quality of the background knowledge that leads to endorsing a certain 
theory. If many or all scientists in the field share the same background knowledge, they may 
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plausibly endorse the same theory on that basis. It would still make sense in that case to test 
the involved background knowledge by looking at novel confirmation.  
Barnes’ approach looks problematic for a different reason, however. Barnes focuses 
on theory endorsement rather than theory construction and assumes that the time of theory 
endorsement is the crucial criterion for distinguishing between old and novel confirmation. 
This forces him, however, to assume that the first endorser’s analysis – which cannot rely on 
other endorsements - cannot itself rely on arguments of novel confirmation. Barnes offers 
no convincing reasons for the a priori implausible assumption that arguments related to 
novel confirmation play no role for the first endorser. In order to see the problem, let us 
assume a theory that has been developed by some scientists but has not been endorsed by 
them or anyone else because it makes highly speculative and counter-intuitive claims. Let us 
further imagine that some of the theory’s novel predictions then get confirmed. Most 
adherents to novel confirmation would take such a scenario as a classical scenario where 
novel confirmation has extra confirmation value: the fact that the theory gets predictions 
right suggests that, despite its counter-intuitive claims, it is on the right track. For Barnes, 
however, the described scenario cannot be an example of novel confirmation because no 
theory endorsement has happened before confirmation.  
In the context of fundamental physics, Barnes’ focus on theory endorsement looks 
clearly inadequate. As an example, let us once more consider the case of the discovery of 
the Higgs particle. Since the Higgs particle constitutes a core prediction of the standard 
model, it seems like a perfect example for novel confirmation. Following Barnes’ scheme, 
novel confirmation of the standard model should have arisen with regard to the Higgs data 
because it raised the trust in those scientists who had endorsed the Higgs hypthesis already 
before it had been empirically confirmed. This, however, neither makes scientific sense nor 
agrees with what actually happened. Next to all high energy physicists endorsed the Higgs 
hypothesis in recent decades. So, the only way to find a distinction in endorsing it would be 
to go back to the early days of the standard model. It would be absurd, however, to ground 
the extra value of novel confirmation in the Higgs case on the assessment of those scientists 
who endorsed the Higgs hypothesis in the 1960s or 1970s. The conceptual understanding of 
standard model physics is vastly superior today than it used to be 40 years ago. Today’s 
analysis of the standard model, however, is mostly carried out by physicists who had not 
even started their career in the 1970s and thus have no record of early endorsement of the 
standard model.  Moreover, most physicists today have no specific knowledge about the 
historic details regarding endorsements of the standard model in the early 1970s. What 
every particle physicist does know and what does matter for theory assessment is that the 
theory itself has an impressive record of novel predictive success. Novel confirmation quite 
obviously is understood to tell something about the standard model and, more specifically, 
about the Higgs hypothesis itself rather than about the physicists who had endorsed it 
before its predictions had been confirmed.  
 I want to point to another problem that arises for Hitchcock and Sober, Kahn et al. 
and Barnes. The problem, which I will call the problem of inherited merits, is related to a 
somewhat surprising and seemingly paradoxical aspect of the scientists’ intuitions regarding 
novel confirmation. Though the problem is not confined to fundamental physics, it can be 
nicely observed in that context.  Let us imagine a scientist A who develops and endorses 
theory TA that correctly reproduces the data E0. Let us assume that TA  predicts data E1, 
which is later confirmed in an experiment S1. Let us further assume that, after E1 has been 
collected, a scientist B understands that E0 and E1 can also be reproduced by an alternative 
theory TB, which, however, makes different predictions than TA regarding a new experiment 
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S2. The question now arises: should TA be taken to have a higher probability of being true (or 
empirically viable at the next experimental step) than TB on the grounds that TA, unlike TB, 
has been confirmed by novel data? The scenarios presented by Hitchcock and Sober, Kahn et 
al. and Barnes 2008 would suggest that it should. Following Hitchcock and Sober, predictive 
success indicates the absence of over-fitting in TA while a theory developed after the 
evidence E1 has been taken into account runs the risk of over-fitting once again. TA thus is 
favored over TB. According to Kahn et al. as well as Barnes 2008, novel confirmation 
establishes that A is an able scientist with sound background knowledge who is capable of 
developing respectively endorsing viable theories. With respect to scientist B, this has not 
been established. The different assessments of scientists A and B then enter the assessments 
of the chances for the viability of TA and TB and thus favor TA.   
 In an actual physical scenario of that kind, the situation would be different, however. 
Admittedly, it may be the case that third party scientists make their first decision whether or 
not to study theory TB based on assessing the merits of its creator or endorser B. Once they 
have studied the theory and have acknowledged that it is coherent and indeed capable of 
reproducing E0 and E1, however, the identity of physicist B would (more or less) drop out of 
the equation. Theory TB would be taken to be just as good a candidate for being viable as TA.  
 A good example of a situation of this kind is the idea of large extra dimensions in high 
energy physics that became popular in recent years. For a long time, descriptions of 
microphysics were based on the notion that space-time was four-dimensional all the way 
down to the Planck length. Phenomena like the unification of the three gauge couplings at a 
high energy scale (the so called GUT scale) were explained by theoretical concepts that were 
based on the assumption of four-dimensional space-time. In the 1990s it was then 
understood that the phenomenology could also be explained by introducing large6 extra-
dimensions. In the corresponding models, space-time is taken to be of a dimension higher 
than four at small distances. Four dimensional space-time only emerges at distances above 
the electroweak scale (regarding nuclear interactions) respectively beyond the scales tested 
by precision measurements of gravitation. Above those scales, the additional dimensions are  
not observed either because the respective dimensions are compactified with a small radius 
or because they have a very specific geometric structure (constituting so called warped 
dimensions). The crucial question for physicists assessing the plausibility of the new models 
is whether these models can reproduce the phenomenology just as well as the more 
traditional theories. The new models are taken to be equally viable candidates if they stand 
that test. The predictive successes of the old 4-dimensional models are not understood to 
give them an advantage over the new hypotheses.    
 At this point, Hitchcock and Sober, Kahn et al. and Barnes could still try one line of 
reasoning. They could say: in the given case, theory evaluation apparently does not rely on 
assessments of over-fitting, the quality of involved scientists or their background knowledge.  
Therefore, novel confirmation does not seem to be significant. That understanding, 
however, does not accord with their own account of the role of novel confirmation. In the 
case of Hitchcock and Sober, any curve fitting scenario allows for later accommodation of a 
new curve to an extended data set. If novel confirmation did not play any role in such 
scenarios, it could not play a role in curve fitting at all. In the cases of Kahn et al. and Barnes, 
it seems obvious that the information gained due to novel confirmation about the scientist 
who developed or endorsed the corresponding theory cannot be devaluated by the mere 
                                                          
6
 ‚Large‘ still means quite small in this context. Large extra dimensions are taken to be significantly larger than 
the Planck length but too small to be observable in experiments up to this point. 
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fact that someone else developed a different theory based on accommodation later on. Why 
should our opinion about one scientist’s quality be altered by the information that different 
scientist developed a different theory? A satisfactory philosophical analysis of the novel 
confirmation problem thus cannot deny the relevance of novel confirmation in cases where 
the phenomenon of inherited merits applies but rather must offer an explanation of how the 
mechanism of inheritance works in the presence of novel confirmation.  
 
Explaining novel confirmation in terms of assessments of limitations to scientific 
underdetermination avoids the problems described above. 
Let us first look at the inadequacy of understanding novel confirmation in 
fundamental physics in terms of curve fitting. The approach of limitations to 
underdetermination is tailored to account for the scenarios we find in fundamental physics. 
Rather than assessing the degree of over-fitting of a scientific theory to empirical data, it 
assesses the degree to which the conditions of scientific reasoning exclude data patterns 
which might seem possible alternatives at first sight. The process of extracting theoretical 
conclusions from consistency arguments in this understanding gains credibility from the 
understanding that scientific underdetermination is substantially limited. This 
understanding, in turn, is inferred from novel confirmation. 
Attempts to relate novel confirmation to assessments of the qualities of scientists 
have been shown to be implausible due to the long time scales between theory creation and 
theory confirmation in high energy physics as well as due to the fact that crucial theories 
often cannot be attributed to individual scientists or research groups. Relating the question 
of novel confirmation to limitations to scientific underdetermination reflects this situation by 
supporting the understanding that novel confirmation tells something about the theory’s 
conceptual embedding rather than about scientists. Furthermore, the approach of 
limitations to underdetermination focuses on theory creation rather than theory 
endorsement. The problems related to Barnes’ focus on theory endorsement therefore are 
avoided as well. 
 The extent to which limitations to scientific underdetermination can account for the 
way novel confirmation is treated in fundamental physics can best be appreciated by looking 
at the problem of inherited merits. Limitations to scientific underdetermination provide a 
clear solution to this problem. The predictive success of theory TA with respect to data E1 is 
taken to indicate limitations to the number n of scientific theories which can be constructed 
based on the data E0. These limitations eventually indicate the chances of TA for offering 
correct predictions of data E2. Since TB and TA are both elements of the very same set of 
scientific theories which are compatible with E0 and E1, all statements on limitations to 
scientific underdetermination relevant for TA must be equally relevant for TB as well. 
Therefore, the ‘inheritance of merits’ is strictly implied by the approach of limitations to 
scientific underdetermination. 
 Another tricky aspect of the ‘inherited merits’ scenario looks entirely straightforward 
from the perspective of limitations to underdetermination. It is natural to acknowledge that 
the discovery of TB has a certain detrimental effect on the expectations regarding the 
predictive success of TA. After all, its discovery opens up the explicit possibility that TB rather 
than TA will be predictively successful with respect to experiment S2. While considerations of 
that kind are not incompatible with other attempts to explain novel confirmation, they do 
not fit in very well either. They constitute an additional argument quite alien to the line of 
reasoning deployed when establishing the significance of novel confirmation. Once novel 
confirmation is related to limitations to scientific underdetermination, however, all 
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considerations neatly blend into one coherent whole. The discovery of TB establishes that a 
certain degree of scientific underdetermination is realized, while instances of novel 
confirmation in the given context indicate that scientific underdetermination may be 
expected to be limited. In conjunction, those items of information create one overall 
assessment of scientific underdetermination that is in the end responsible for the trust one 
has in the predictions of TA and TB.  
 
7: Conclusion 
 
We have seen that the approach of limitations to underdetermination offers a viable basis 
for explaining novel confirmation in fundamental physics. The approach clearly does not 
provide a universal explanation of novel confirmation in all scientific contexts, however. We 
do find instances of curve fitting in many fields of science where the arguments presented by 
Hitchcock and Sober apply nicely while the underdetermination approach does not work. 
Equally, we find contexts in science and beyond where assessments of the capacities of 
individual scientists or agents play a crucial role in judging a statement’s viability. When 
Warren Buffett tells us about his expectations regarding the stock markets, it seems to make 
much sense to judge his capability based on his record of novel confirmation and to assess 
the viability of his statement accordingly. It seems a far less promising idea to evaluate 
Buffett’s statement based on an assessment of the number of possible theories about the 
stock market.  
 Still, we have argued in the previous section that the contexts where successful novel 
predictions occur most conspicuously in science are those where the approach of assessing 
limitations to scientific underdetermination does apply and other approaches seem less 
adequate. One might interpret this observation a little more extensively. If we want to 
understand the particular strength of science in providing successful novel predictions, 
limitations to scientific underdetermination seem the most promising place to look. The 
instantiation of such limitations is an essential precondition for the novel predictive success 
of science and understanding those limitations in a given context is essential for 
understanding a theory’s status and its prospects. On that basis, the strength of limitations 
to scientific underdetermination constitutes the conceptually most significant thing 
scientists can learn from novel confirmation. The analysis of limitations to 
underdetermination therefore can provide the most substantial extra value of novel 
confirmation. 
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